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NOTES
upholding H.B. 1221 as a valid exercise of the state's police power, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has appropriately recognized that it is a legitimate
end for the state to seek to protect correlative rights by preventing discrimina-
tion in favor of one owner as against another even in the absence of waste.
Gregory F. Pilcher
Procedure: Effect of Attorney Fees on Finality of
Judgment-Amendment to Rule 1.11(c)
Despite an unprecedented triple revision of its rules by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, there continues to be a serious question on the most fun-
damental level of appellate procedure. When must a petition in error be filed
with the Oklahoma Supreme Court for it to be timely where the trial court
has decided all substantive issues raised in an action other than the issue of
attorney fees? An attorney may have to choose between the date of the deci-
sion on the substantive issues and the date of ruling on attorney fees. Practi-
tioners need a clear-cut rule so that there remains no doubt as to which date
is the jurisdictional terminal point for perfecting an appeal. Because the timely
filing of a petition in error is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review
in Oklahoma, it is imperative that the petition be filed within thirty days of
a final judgment.'
This note will explore the history of rule 1.11(c) through its various revi-
sions promulgated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The progression of case
law on final judgments and rulings on attorney fees will be examined. The
1. The Rules for Appellate Procedures in Civil Cases, 12 OKTA. STAT. § 990 (1981), pro-
vides the Oklahoma Supreme Court with the power to promulgate rules for appellate procedure
having the force of statute. Additionally, section 990 states that "except for the filing of a peti-
tion in error . . . all steps in perfecting an appeal are not jurisdictional." By negative inference,
the filing of the petition in error is jurisdictional. See State v. County Beverage License No.
ABL-78-145, 652 P.2d 292 (Okla. 1982); L'Aquarius v. Maynard, 634 P.2d 1310 (Okla. 1981);
Esker v. Kip's Big Boy, Inc., 632 P.2d 414 (Okla. 1981); Western Okla. Ch. of Nat'l Elec.
Contrs. Ass'n v. State ex reL Corp. Comm'n, 616 P.2d 1143 (Okla. 1981).
Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice Hargrave gave the practicing bar valuable guidance on
the importance of filing a timely appeal. Justice Hargrave writes:
The filing of this petition is jurisdictional and may not be extended by the trial
court or the Supreme Court. Thus, once the 30 day limitation period has passed,
the once appealable and assumedly erroneous decision will become the law of the
case unless it is subject to vacation under 12 O.S. § 1031, or is void on the face
of the judgment roll and subject to collateral attack .... If any doubt exists about
the finality of an order, the necessity to appeal, or when the 30 day period expires,
the practitioner should consider filing early enough to clear all doubts on the subject.
See Hargrave, Brief Observations on Appealable Orders, 53 ORA. B.J. 1015 (Apr. 24, 1982).
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present rule and its potential ramifications will be considered. Additionally,
recommendations will be made for a fourth revision of rule 1.11(c) in order
to avoid the necessity of judicial interpretation of a rule that remains a mystery.
History: Appeals-Prayers for Attorney Fees
Attorneys are justifiably confused over when an appeal must be filed where
all issues raised in the action have been resolved except the award of attorney
fees when a party is or may be entitled to such an award. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has promulgated three versions of its rules on the subject in
less than three years. The first of this trilogy became effective July 12, 1984,
and was captioned: "(c) Premature Commencement of Appeal Before Prayer
for Attorney's Fee Award Has Been Determined by the Trial Court. "I This
first revision of the rule made no provision for a final judgment from which
to prosecute an appeal where the trial court had not determined the issue
of attorney fees. 3 The rule specifically identified an appeal filed before the
award of attorney fees as a "prematurely-filed appeal." 4 Thus, it appeared
that any appeal prior to award of attorney fees under the 1984 version of
the rule was ipso facto premature.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, on June 5, 1986, withdrew rule 1.11 (c) and
replaced it with rule 1.11(c)-(e).5 Unlike the 1984 version, the rule promulgated
in June of '[986 did not prevent appeal prior to award of attorney fees. Subsec-
2. Rule 1.11(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, 12 OKLA. STAT. ch.
15, app. 2 (Supp. 1984), provides in its entirety:
(c) Premature Commencement of Appeal Before Prayer for Attorney's Fee A ward
Has Been Determined by the Trial Court
Whenever an appeal is deemed to have been commenced before final order or
judgment was rendered in the case and the court finds that disposition of a party's
or parties' prayer for an attorney's fee is the only remaining issue to be determined
by the trial court, the prematurely-filed appeal need not be dismissed but may be
stayed until the unresolved issue shall have been determined. Any party who may
desire corrective relief after a final order or judgment is rendered by the trial court
must timely file a petition-in-error or an amended petition-in-error. Failure by any
party to bring an appeal within the maximum time prescribed by law after final
order or judgment shall have been rendered will preclude that party from securing
corrective relief and will result in the dismissal of the prematurely-filed appeal.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Rule 1.11(c)-(e) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, 12 OKIA. STAT. ch.
15, app. 2 (Supp. 1986), provides in its entirety:
(c) Appeal Prior to Allowance of Attorney Fees to a Party Shall Not Constitute
a Premature Appeal
Failure of the trial court to award attorney fee [sic] in any action shall not pre-
vent a party aggrieved by the trial court's decision of all other questions from seek-
ing a review of such judgment in this court by the timely filing of a petition in
error. The trial court may determine the issue as to attorney fees after the appeal
has been lodged or may reserve such issue and determine the same after remand
of the matter from this court. At which time the amount of appellate related legal
services may also be determined by the trial court provided the appellate court
has first approved the allowance of such fees before the issuance of its mandate.
[Vol. 40
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tion (c) of the rule provided: "Failure of the trial court to award attorney
fee [sic] in any action shall not prevent a party aggrieved by the trial court's
decision of all other questions from seeking a review of such judgment in
this court by the timely filing of a petition in error."' The rule did not re-
quire a district court to relinquish its jurisdiction entirely, however, and pro-
vided: "The trial court may determine the issue as to attorney fees after the
appeal has been lodged.'" The rule also provided a procedure to review the
award of attorney fees during pendency of the appeal of the substantive issues.'
The last subsection, 1.11(e), stated that the rule was immediately applicable
to all appeals. 9
What was never clear under the second rule was whether the language pro-
viding that review could be sought on substantive issues of a case before award
of attorney fees was directory or mandatory." If the language was merely
directory, the attorney could safely wait to appeal all issues until after the
award of attorney fees. On the other hand, if the language was mandatory,
and the attorney waited to file a petition in error after the award of attorney
fees, catastrophic consequences would result if the jurisdictional thirty days
had passed since the trial court's ruling on the substantive issues. Oklahoma
Supreme Court Justice Rudolph Hargrave has suggested that if there is a ques-
tion as to when a judgment is final, "the practitioner should consider filing
early enough to clear all doubts on the subject."'"
The court's third revision of the rule was promulgated on September 22,
1986." This version substituted a new paragraph for subsection (c) and added
a new paragraph to subsection (d)." Since this revision does not contain an
(d) Appeal After Allowance of Attorney Fees
Where the trial court resolves the attorney fee issue during the pendency of the
appeal a party aggrieved may, by filing a timely petition in error, or an amended
petition in error, have a review of such ruling.
(e) Subsections (c) and (d) above shall be effective immediately and shall be ap-
plicable to all appeals including those presently pending.
6. Id., 1.11(c).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. ld, 1.11(e).
10. Fraser, Appeal and Error: Procedure for Appealing a Case, 21 OKLA. L. REv. 307 (1968).
For authority that procedural requirements may be directory, see Miller v. State, 94 Okla. Crim.
198, 232 P.2d 651 (1951); City of Enid v. Champlin Ref. Co., 112 Okla. 168, 240 P. 604 (1925).
See also Young v. Postal Mut. Indem. Co., 189 Okla. 187, 115 P.2d 139 (1941); Davis v. Fariss,
180 Okla. 125, 68 P.2d 417 (1937).
11. Hargrave, supra note 1.
12. 12 Oman. STAT. ch. 15, app. 2, Rule 1.11(c)-(d) (Supp. 1986).
13. The most recent version of rule 1.11(c)-(d) provides:
(c) Appeal Prior to Allowance of Attorney Fees to a Party Shall Not Constitute
a Premature Appeal
Failure of the trial court to award attorney fee [sic] in any action shall not pre-
vent a party aggrieved by the trial court's decision of all other questions from seek-
ing a review of such judgment in this court by the timely filing of a petition in
error. The trial court may determine the issue as to attorney fees after the appeal
has been lodged or may reserve such issue and determine the same, together with
1987]
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effective date, it is effective immediately and applies to all appeals including
those presently pending."
A comparison of the June and September versions of rule 1.11(c) reveals
no substantive change in subsection (c). The current rule still provides that:
"Failure of the trial court to award attorney fee [sic] in any action shall not
prevent a party aggrieved by the trial court's decision of all other questions
from seeking a review of such judgment in this court by the timely filing
of a petition in error."" The second sentence of subsection (c) in the most
recent rule is a consolidation of the last two sentences in subsection (c) of
the June rule that gave the trial court the option of determining the issue
of attorney fees after an appeal had been lodged or reserving the ruling until
after a decision on appeal had been rendered, at which time the trial court
could also hear any application for costs of appellate-related legal services.
The original version stated that the appellate court must authorize the award
of appellate attorney fees. However, the current version does not require this. I6
The material differences between the June and September versions of rule
1.11 are found in subsection (d). The caption and first sentence of this sec-
tion are identica, except that the sentence prescribing the procedure for review
of attorney fees where the trial court resolves the issue during pendency of
the appeal of the substantive issues is renumbered as part (1).1' In addition,
a new sentence states: "(2) Where the trial court reserves ruling on the at-
torneys fee issue a party aggrieved by the trial court's decision on other ques-
tions may obtain review of such other questions by filing timely petition in
error after the trial court's ruling on the attorneys fee issue.'" 8
Subsection (d)(2) provides that when the trial court reserves ruling on the
attorneys fee issue, after deciding the other questions in the action, the ag-
grieved party may appeal any of the issues after the trial court has decided
the attorneys fee issue. The rule does not specifically require the appellant
to wait until all issues have been decided before perfecting a timely appeal,
but that is its implication. The last sentence of subsection (c) allows the trial
court to determine the issue of attorney fees after the appeal of all other issues
has been taken or to reserve the issue and "determine the same, together with
an application for appellate related legal services, after remand of the matter from
this court.
(d) Appeal After Allowance of Attorney Fees
(1) Where the trial court resolves the attorney fee issue during the pendency of
the appeal a party aggrieved may, by filing a timely petition in error, or an amended
petition in error, have a review of such ruling.
(2) where the trial court reserves ruling on the attorney fee issue a party aggrieved
by the court's decision on other questions may obtain review of such other
questions by filing timely petition in error after the trial court's ruling on the at-
torney fee issue.
14. See supra note 5.
15. See supra note 13.
16. See supra notes 13 and 5.
17. Id.
18. See supra note 13.
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application for appellate related legal services, after remand of the matter
from this court." 9
Subsections (c) and (d) may be inconsistent since subsection (c) allows the
trial court to reserve judgment on attorney fees until after the supreme court
has ruled on a prior appeal of attorney fees and subsection (d)(2) may not
allow for appeal of the substantive issues where the trial court reserves ruling
on attorney fees until such issue be decided. Although the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has been struggling mightily over the past three years to draft a definitive
rule for taking an appeal where attorney fees are at issue, the most recent
of three versions of rule 1.11(c) is still ambiguous.
Interpretation of Rule 1.11(c)-(e) in Light of Prior Case Law
The dilemma of when to file a petition in error is not a new one for the
practicing bar in Oklahoma. As early as 1921, the supreme court recognized
there was "an apparent irreconcilable conflict of authorities on what con-
stitutes a final judgment."2 In Wells v. Shriver it was recognized that although
several causes of action might be joined in one action, there could be but
one judgment and one appeal in the action. The court held that there could
be but one final judgment from which an appeal would lie and defined a
final judgment as "the final determination of the rights of the parties in an
action." 2' By 1951, the court was willing to recognize that where several related
matters were litigated in one case, there could be several successive final and
appealable orders, although there is but one judgment disposing of the main
action. 22 Considering this recognition, appeals should be prosecuted under
rule 1.11(c) as soon as all issues other than attorney fees are ruled upon by
the trial'court, unless the trial court has specifically reserved attorney fees
as an issue under subsection (d)(2). In this latter case, under subsection (d)(2)
any appeal prior to award of attorney fees would appear to be premature.
However, under the most recent version of 1.11(c), the practitioner ought
to treat the trial court's order disposing of the main action as the final judg-
ment and a later award of attorney fees as simply a collateral appealable order.
In November of 1979, the supreme court decided two cases concerning the
issue of final judgments where attorney fees had not been awarded.2 3 In the
first of these, Hubbard v. Hubbard,24 the court held a decree adjudicating
all issues except attorney fees to be a final order. 25 In dicta, the court ex-
plained why the order was final without a ruling on the attorney fee issue:
19. Id.
20. Wells v. Shriver, 81 Okla. 108, 197 P. 460, 462 (1921).
21. Id., 197 P. at 479. (quoting Code of Civil Procedure, Revised Laws 1910, § 5123).
22. Stubblefield v. General Motors Accep. Corp., 619 P.2d 620, 624 (1930); State ex rel.
Bd. of Pub. Affairs v. Neff, 205 Okla. 205, 236 P.2d 681, 683 (1951).
23. King v. Finnell, 603 P.2d 754 (Okla. 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla.
1979).
24. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
25. Id.
1987]
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Clearly, the decree as entered was a final order, as it resulted in
a final adjudication of all issues involved, save attorney fees, which
we consider to be an item of cost. We do not find that the trial
court's action constituted error, but we do believe that it would
be better procedure for the trial court to rule on the question of
trial attorney fees at the time the trial of the case is completed.
2
6
Thus, although the supreme court would have preferred that the trial court
rule on the attorney fee issue at the time all other issues were decided, its
failure to do so was not error and the appeal was not premature.2 7
The second case, decided the same month, King v. Finnell,2" at first ap-
pears to be contrary to Hubbard. The court found the order of the trial court
had resolved only the issue of liability and that there had been no pronounce-
ment made in regard to damages or attorney fees. 29 Since damages were not
decided, the order did not constitute a final order within the meaning of rule
1.11(b).3 [owever, the court did not indicate whether the trial court's order
26. Id. at 753.
27. Justice Opala dissented from the adoption of both the June and the September 1986
versions of rule 1 II(c). See supra note 2, at 1547-50. Relying on Hubbard, he dissented because
he thought the better procedure to be for the trial court to rule on the issue of attorney fees
at the time the tra was completed. Id. But see State ex rel. Bd. of Affairs v. Neff, 205 Okla.
205, 236 P.2d 681 (1951) (recognizing that where several related matters are joined in one case,
there could be several successive final and appealable orders). Justice Opala also objected on
the ground that subsection (c) provided for retroactivity of the rule to appeals brought before
the effective date of adoption. Id. However, the retroactivity question is beyond the scope of
this note.
28. 603 P.2d 754 (Okla. 1979).
29. Id. at 756.
30. Definitions of final orders or judgments are found at various places within the Oklahoma
Statutes. See Rule 1.11(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, which provides:
"(b) Computation of Judgment Date and Definition of Order. In cases tried to a jury, judgment
is deemed rendered when the verdict is returned and accepted by the court without reservation."
12 Oi.A. STAxT. . 696 (1961). "If judgment on jury verdict is reserved or if the case is tried
to the court, judgment is deemed rendered when its terms are completely pronounced by the
judge and clearly resolve all issues in controversy." Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases,
12 OKLA. STAT. ch. 15, app. 2. In the same title, the definition of a final order or judgment
is set out in rule 1.10(a): "Within the meaning of Part I the term 'final judgment or final order'
is synonymous with the term 'decision.' " Id. Section 953 of title 12 defines a final order as:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect,
determines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order affecting a substan-
tial right, made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action
after judgment, is a final order, which may be vacated, modified or reversed, as
provided in this article.
Id. § 953. Section 681 of the same statute defines a judgment: "A judgment is the final deter-
mination of tle rights of the parties in an action." Id. § 681.
Statutory definitions have not, however, settled the issue of when there is a final judgment
from which to prosecute an appeal. See, e.g., Presbyterian Hosp., Inc. v. Board of Tax-Roll
Corrections, 693 P.2d 611 (Okla. 1984); McCullough v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 626 P.2d 1332
(Okla. 1981); Shaw' v. Sturgeon, 304 P.2d 341 (Okla. 1956); Centcorp Corp. v. Gulf Prod. Corp.,
183 Okla. 436. 83 P.2d 181 (1938); Wells v. Shriver, 81 Okla. 108, 197 P. 460 (1921).
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would have been a final judgment if the damages had been decided in absence
of an attorney fee award.
Hubbard and King can be reconciled. Considering the holding in Hubbard,
had the award of attorney fees been the only outstanding issue unresolved
at the time of the appeal in King, the court would not have held the petition
in error prematurely filed. In Gilbreath v. Gilbreath,31 the court commented
on King:
King involved an action on a promissory note in which the trial
court granted summary judgment on the issue of liability only. We
held that since no pronouncement had been made with respect to
the issues of damages and attorney fees, the issue of liability was
not appealable as a final judgment as required by Rule 1.11(b).
In that case, the issue of attorney fees was inseparably intertwined
with the issue of damages.
32
The very next year the Supreme Court again considered a case, In re Estate
of Buckner v. Buckner,3 3 where attorney fees were an item of cost. The trial
court initially assessed costs, excluding attorney fees, on September 25; the
award of attorney fees was entered October 12, and the petition in error was
filed October 27. The Buckner court held that there was no final judgment
until attorney fees had been awarded, basing its decision on the trial court's
apparent "intent" to award fees as part of the response to the Motion to
Assess Costs."4
Perhaps this is the type of situation that, under subsection (d)(4) of the
most recent rule, would result in an appeal being premature where the trial
court intends to decide the issue of attorney fees before there is an appeal
of any of the issues. However, the supreme court should amend subsection
(d)(2) to make it clear that a party cannot appeal where the trial court reserves
the issue.
3 5
Most recently, the court addressed the effect of the failure to award at-
torney fees on final judgments in Gilbreath v. Gilbreath.3 6 The decree in
Gilbreath was granted July 23. The wife's timely motion for new trial was
overruled and eight days later the husband filed his petition in error. The
issue of attorney fees was decided on September 23 and the wife filed a cross-
appeal on October 8, appealing both the September 23 ruling as to attorney
31. 56 OKLA. B.J. 929 (Apr. 20, 1985).
32. Id. at 930 (emphasis added).
33. 609 P.2d 1285 (Okla. 1980).
34. In re Estate of Buckner v. Buckner, 609 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Okla. 1980).
35. The supreme court reversed the award of attorney fees in Buckner finding they did not
fall within the purview of either statute or contract. See Hall v. Coe, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Hanska
v. Hanska, 395 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1964). There are exceptions to the general rule that attorney
fees are not to be awarded in absence of statute or contract. See City Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co.
v. Owens, 565 P.2d 4, 8 (1977), recognizing an inherent equitable power in the court to award
attorney fees regardless of the fact they are not authorized by statute or contract.
36. 56 OKLA. B.J. 929 (Apr. 20, 1985).
19871
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fees and the decree of divorce granted July 23. The court held that a decree
of divorce is final and appealable when all issues other than the right to at-
torney fees are determined and not when a decision is made as to attorney
fees. The court reasoned: "[I]f the trial court is empowered to retain jurisdic-
tion over the request for attorney fees, then surely we have jurisdiction to
hear the appeal from the divorce decree even though the trial court has re-
tained jurisdiction over the request for attorney fees." '
7
Both the court of appeals and the supreme court found the decree of divorce
final and appealable when rendered, not when a decision was made with respect
to attorney fees.38 Since the husband's petition in error was not premature,
the court reviewed the issue of attorney fees.
In Gilbreath, the court never addressed the 1984 version of rule 1.11(c)
designating an appeal premature where disposition of attorney fees is the
only issue remaining for the trial court. This seems curious since the facts
place the case squarely within the purview of the rule. However, Gilbreath
was appealed in 1981 and any comments about the 1984 rule would only have
been dicta. Yet, Gilbreath could have been decided under either the June
or September versions of rules 1.11(c) and 1.11(d). Assuming that the trial
court had not specifically reserved the issue of attorney fees, as provided
for under subsection (d)(2) of the September version, the same result would
have been reached. Had the trial court specifically reserved the issue, the
petition in error would have been considered prematurely filed under the
most recent rule.
Recommendations: The Need for Change
Allowing appeal of substantive issues in a case as soon as possible is sup-
ported by elements of fairness and equitable considerations. Parties whose
property or other interests are bound up in litigation, often for years before
there is a decision in the district court, should be allowed review by the ap-
pellate court at the earliest possible time. Even when the earliest date is chosen
for filing a petition in error, the date of a ruling on the substantive issues,
the parties will often have to wait anywhere from several months to years
before the case is disposed of on appeal. There is no need to delay considera-
tion of these substantive issues while waiting for a ruling by the trial court
on award of attorney fees. In accordance with these considerations of equity
and fairness, rule 1.11(c) provides that: "Failure of the trial court to award
attorney fee [sic] in any action shall not prevent a party aggrieved by the
trial court's decision of all other questions from seeking review of such judg-
ment in this court by the timely filing of a petition in error." 3 9
The question of when to appeal where attorney fees are at issue is one area
of the law that justifies a bright-line rule. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ap-
37. Id. at 930.
38. Id.
39. See supra note 5 (emphasis added).
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pears to have attempted to delineate such a definitive rule in its most recent
version of rule 1.11(c), but a number of questions remain unanswered. Primary
among these questions is whether an appeal must be taken prior to award
of attorney fees in order to be timely, or whether a party may elect to appeal
after all issues, including attorney fees, have been decided. In the absence
of judicial guidance in the form of a clearly delineated rule, there will remain
unanswered questions. Trial counsel might be reluctant to appeal the substan-
tive issues without a ruling on attorney fees for fear appeal might waive the
claim to attorney fees.
Another vexing question associated with the present rule is whether once
there has been a final judgment as to all substantive issues and the time for
appeal is past, may a party then request attorney fees or is he foreclosed from
doing so by a final judgment in the case? The court might consider a rule
specifying that where there is a final judgment of all issues except an award
of attorney fees, the request for attorney fees must be filed within the same
time period within which to make a request for a new trial.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court should seriously consider another amend-
ment to the rule. Another revision of rule 1.1 l(c) would be preferable to ex-
planation or application of the current rule in a prolonged case-by-case develop-
ment. The following is a proposed draft of rule 1.11(c)-(f):
(c) Appeal Prior to Allowance of Attorney Fees to a Party Shall Not Con-
stitute a Premature Appeal Where the Trial Court Has Not Specifically Re-
served the Attorney Fee Issue. Where a trial court has decided all questions
that were raised in an action but has not awarded an attorney fee, where
a party is or may be entitled to an attorney fee, a party aggrieved by the
trial court's decision on the issues that were decided may seek an immediate
review of the decision by the timely filing of a petition in error, and the filing
of a petition in error shall not prevent the trial court from awarding an at-
torney fee after the appeal has been lodged; or the aggrieved party may wait
until after the trial court resolves the attorney fee issue to seek a review of
all issues decided by the trial court; provided, however, that where the trial
court specifically reserves ruling on the attorney fee issue when it decides the
other questions in the action, the aggrieved party shall not seek a review of
any of the issues decided by the trial court until the trial court has decided
the attorney fee issue.
(d) Appeal After Allowance of Attorney Fees. Where the trial court resolves
the attorney fee issue during the pendence of the appeal, a party aggrieved
may, by filing a timely petition in error, or an amended petition in error,
have a review of such ruling.
(e) Attorney Fee Requests Shall Be Filed Within Ten (10) Days. Where a
court fails to award an attorney fee at the time it decides all other questions
in an action, a party who is entitled to an attorney fee shall request the award
of an attorney fee within ten (10) days after the decision on the other issues,
whether or not he has already requested the award of an attorney fee or he
waives his right to recover an attorney fee. A request for an attorney fee
is not necessary where the court has reserved ruling on the attorney fee issue.
19871
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A request for attorney fees shall not extend the time period for filing a timely
petition in error.
(f) Subsections (c) through (e) above shall be effective thirty (30) days from
the first date of publication."
The proposed rule would allow for the following options. It would (1) give
the appellant the option of appealing either where the trial court decides all
issues except attorney fees or waiting until all issues, including attorney fees,
are decided; or (2) permit the appellant to appeal only after attorney fees
have been awarded where the trial court reserves the issue. Subsection (3)
would require an application for attorney fees to be filed within a certain
period to avoid a waiver of the claim. The proposed rule in subsection (f)
would eliminate questions of retrospective application by providing an effec-
tive date thirty days after publication.
Conclusion
The practicing bar needs access to a rule so definitive as to leave no ques-
tion as to when a petition in error must be filed where the trial court has
decided all issues except attorney fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has
gone through a succession of three rules in the last three years attempting
to provide the bar with just such a rule. The effort is to be commended.
Steps in the right direction have been taken, but one more step is necessary.
The court should amend the rule a fourth time, leaving no doubt as to what
procedure the trial attorney must comply with where he has applied for an
attorney fee award. Such an amendment would avoid the necessity of judicial
interpretation of the present rule.
The court has the opportunity to clarify important issues for attorneys who
must operate under procedural rules and for jurists who must interpret and
apply them. Under rule 1.11(c), a district court judge need not worry if an
appeal of the substantive issues removes his jurisdiction over the issue of at-
40. The following is a section-by-section comparison of the present rule as promulgated by
the supreme court and the rule proposed by the author.
Subsection (c) of the current rule allows for appeal prior to an award of attorney fees, but
neither requires sLch appeal nor provides for an alternative to appeal after all issues, including
attorney fees, have been decided. The proposed rule delineates the options of appealing prior
to an award of attorney fees or waiting until all issues have been decided, except in a situation
where the trial ccurt specifically reserves the issue of attorney fees.
Subsection (d)(1) of the present rule is identical to subsection (d) of the proposed rule. Subsection
(d)(2) is eliminated from this portion of the proposed rule and the issue of the trial court's reserved
ruling on attorney fees is dealt with in subsection (c).
Subsection (e) of the proposed rule has no counterpart in the present rule. It requires an
application for attorney fees to be filed within ten days after a decision in order to avoid waiver
of such claim, except where the trial court has reserved its ruling on the issue. Such a request
will not extend the thirty-day period for filing a timely petition in error.
Subsection (f) is also not found in the present rule. It provides for an effective date thirty
days from the date of first publication to avoid some of the concerns raised by Justice Opala
concerning retrospective legislation.
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